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1.
Résumé: Cet article présente un cadre économétrique général visant à mod-
éliser conjointement les ﬂuctuations de courbes de taux associées à diﬀérents
émetteurs obligataires. Les titres sous-jacents à ces courbes peuvent diﬀérer
en termes de qualité de crédit de l’émetteur et/ou en termes de liquidité. Les
facteurs de risque sont aﬀectés par des chocs gaussiens dont les covariances
dépendent du régime qui prévaut au moment du choc. Les tendances des fac-
teurs de risque dépendent également des régimes. Le processus suivi par les
régimes est une chaîne de Markov dont les probabilités de transition sont non-
homogènes sous la mesure historique. Bien que riche, le modèle permet de
valoriser les obligations à partir de simples formules récursives. Plusieurs ex-
emples numériques sont présentés. En particulier, nous montrons comment les
changements de régime peuvent être mis à proﬁt pour modéliser des phénomènes
de contagion sectorielle. Une extension visant à intégrer les notes attribuées par
les agences de notation est également proposée.
Classiﬁcations JEL: E43, E44, E47, G12, G24.
Mots clés: risque de crédit, risque de liquidité, structure par terme des taux
d’intérêt, modèle aﬃne, changement de régime, processus Car.
Abstract: In this paper, we present a general discrete-time aﬃne framework
aimed at jointly modeling yield curves associated with diﬀerent debtors. The
underlying ﬁxed-income securities may diﬀer in terms of credit quality and/or
in terms of liquidity. The risk factors follow conditionally Gaussian processes,
with drifts and variance-covariance matrices that are subject to regime shifts
described by a Markov chain with (historical) non-homogenous transition prob-
abilities. While ﬂexible, the model remains tractable. In particular, bond prices
are given by quasi-explicit formulas. Various numerical examples are proposed,
including a sector-contagion model and credit-rating modeling.
JEL codes: E43, E44, E47, G12, G24.
Keywords: credit risk, liquidity risk, term structure, aﬃne model, regime
switching, Car process.
21. Introduction
Though already strong before the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the case for including regime shifts
within term-structure models for defaultable bonds is obviously stronger now (see, amongst
many others, Christensen, Lopez and Rudebusch, 2009 [16]). This paper proposes a general
aﬃne term-structure framework aimed at jointly modeling several yield curves associated
with diﬀerent obligors, in the presence of regime switching.
Motivated by derivative-pricing or credit-risk-management objectives, a large strand of
the literature related to ﬁxed-income securities has focused on the joint modeling of sev-
eral yield curves. In this context, Jarrow, Lando, Turnbull (1997) [45], Lando (1998) [50]
or Duﬃe and Singleton (1999) [28] have highlighted the potential of aﬃne term-structure
frameworks to jointly model yield curves associated with various obligors subject to default
risk. Their intensity-based –or reduced-form– approaches used to model defaults diﬀer from
the more structural approaches originating in Black and Scholes (1973) [10] and Merton
(1974) [55].1 Whereas the intensity-based framework was originally designed to account for
default risk, it is also appropriate to model liquidity-pricing eﬀects and it can accomodate
time-varying recovery rates as well (see Duﬃe and Singleton (1999) [28]). Numerous fur-
ther developments have illustrated the ﬂexibility and tractability of aﬃne-term structure
models to capture the comovements of diﬀerent yield curves (see e.g. Duﬀee, 1999 [25] or
Gourieroux, Monfort and Polimenis, 2006 [38]).
There is strong evidence of regime switching in the dynamics of interest rates (see, e.g.,
Hamilton, 1988 [41] or Cai, 1994 [11]). Regime shifts have been successfully introduced in
term-structure models of risk-free interest rates by, amongst others, Bansal and Zhou (2002)
[5], Monfort and Pegoraro (2007) [58], Dai, Singleton and Yang (2007) [19] or Ang Bekaert
and Wei (2008) [3]. Whereas these contributions put forward the importance of modeling
regime switching in yield-curve models, a few has been done to integrate such a feature
in term-structure models of defaultable bonds. However, empirical studies point to the
existence of diﬀerent regimes in the default risk valuation (see, e.g., Davies, 2004 [22] and
2008 [23] or Alexander and Kaeck, 2008 [1]). From a theoretical point of view, Hackbarth,
Miao and Morellec (2006) [40] provide a theoretical model to explain the dependence of
credit spread on business-cycle regimes. In the same vein, Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev
(2007) [8] and David (2008) [21] adopt structural models including regime switching to
assess the inﬂuence of diﬀerent states of the economic cycles on the credit-risk premia.
In our framework, the state variables follow discrete-time conditionally Gaussian pro-
cesses.2 Extending the work of Gourieroux, Monfort and Polimenis (2006) [38], the Gaus-
sian processes present drifts and variance-covariance matrices that are subject to regime
shifts. The latter are described by a Markov chain with (historical) non-homogenous trans-
ition probabilities. Particular attention is paid to the tractability of the model and its
estimation. Tractability is notably obtained through an extensive use of Car’s –Compound
autoregressive processes– properties (see, e.g. Darolles, Gourieroux and Jasiak, 2006 [20]),
which leads to quasi-explicit fomulas for bond prices. Both historical and risk-neutral dy-
namics are explicitly modeled, which is helpful for choosing appropriate speciﬁcations under
the historical measure, for dealing simultaneously with pricing and forecasting, for Value-
1Cathcart and El-Jahel, 2006 [13]) have shown that the two approaches (reduced-form and structural) are
somewhat reconcilable.
2While most of the earliest aﬃne defaultable-bond term-struture models are in continuous-time form (see
e.g. Duﬃe and Singleton (1999) [28]), Gourieroux, Monfort and Polimenis (2006) [38] have shown that
discrete-time aﬃne models are well-suited to credit-risk modeling and that they present higher ﬂexibility
than their continuous-time counterparts. In particular, the discrete-time framework makes it easier to
properly speciﬁy the dynamics of the observable risk factors under the historical probability measure.
3at-Risk calculations or for Sharpe-ratio computations.3 We propose a sequential estimation
strategy, which is intended to facilitate the estimation of unobservable factors (including
latent risk factors and regimes).
The modeling of defaults is based on the so-called “doubly-stochastic” assumption: correl-
ations between default events arise solely through dependence on some common underlying
stochastic factors –also termed with “risk factors”– which inﬂuence the default probabilities
of every single loans.4 Some of the factors may be unobserved. In this sense, our model
accomodates frailty. This feature is advocated by recent papers suggesting that includ-
ing only observable covariates in default-intensity speciﬁcations results in poorly-estimated
conditional probabilities of default (see e.g. Lando and Nielsen, 2008 [51] or Duﬃe et al.,
2009 [27]).
Including regime shifts in a discrete-time term-structure model may aﬀect pricing through
several channels: (i) regimes aﬀect the historical and risk-neutral dynamics of the risk
factors, (ii) regimes appear in the stochastic discount factor (s.d.f.) –which implies that
regime-transition risk is priced– and (iii) regimes appear in the default-intensity functions.
This results in a large degree of ﬂexibility in the model speciﬁcations, which is illustrated
by several numerical examples in the paper. In particular, since default intensitites can
be aﬀected by the regime variable, our model is appropriate to capture default clustering.
Indeed, if one regime implies dramatic increases in the default probabilities of all or part
of the debtors, numerous defaults will simultaneously take place during this regime.
Beyond the enrichment of the speciﬁcations of the risk factors and those of the default
intensities by introducing nonlinearities, the regime-switching feature can be exploited to
handle speciﬁc forms of contagions. Contagion eﬀects, whose consequences are cascades
of subsequent spread changes, is explained by the existence of close ties between ﬁrms
(see, e.g., Jarrow and Yu, 2001 [47], Davies and Lo, 2001 [24] or Giesecke, 2004 [36]).
Contagion takes place when the default probability of any debtor can be aﬀected by the
default event of another one. Given that our baseline model relies on the doubly-stochastic
or conditional-dependence assumption –which states that, conditional to the underlying
factors and regimes, the default events of the ﬁrms in a portfolio are independent– direct
contagion eﬀects can not be captured. Nevertheless, we can model speciﬁc contagion eﬀects
in two distinct ways. First, our framework can accomodate the speciﬁc contagion case where
one entity –or, for the sake of tractability, a small number of them– aﬀects the default
probability of the others: it suﬃces to make one of the regimes corresponds to the default
state of this entity. Second, the regime-switching feature can be exploited in order to capture
“sector-contagion” phenomena. The sectors can represent diﬀerent industries or diﬀerent
geographical areas. Each sector can be “infected” or not. When a sector gets infected, the
default intensities of its constituents (the debtors) shift upwards. In this context, sector
contagion stems from the parameterizations of the matrix of regime-transition probabilities.
For instance, you can easily model infection probabilities that depend positively on the
number of sectors already infected.
Our baseline model considers only one credit event: the default of the debtor. However,
credit events include more generally the changes in credit ratings like these attributed by
agencies like Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s or Fitch. There are several reasons why it may be
desirable to model not only default events but also rating transitions (see Cantor, 2004 [12]
or Gagliardini and Gourieroux, 2001 [35]).5 It turns out that our framework can be adapted
3Regarding the latter point, see Duﬀee (2010) [26].
4In our framework, these shocks include both Gaussian shocks and regime-shift shocks.
5Several of the main credit models currently being used in the industry, such as J.P. Morgan’s CreditMetrics
(1997) [48], draw on the credit-migration approach. For presentation, comparison and evaluation of these
4to accomodate time-varying credit-rating migrations along the lines of Lando (1998) [50]
while keeping quasi-explicit bond-pricing formulas.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 respectively present
the historical and risk-neutral dynamics of the variables. Section 4 gives the bond-pricing
formulas with zero or non-zero recovery rates. Section 4 also provides numerical examples.
Section 5 deals with internal-consistency restrictions that arise when yields or asset returns
are included amongst the risk factors. In Section 6, we propose an estimation strategy.
Section 7 shows how the model accomodates the pricing of liquidity. Section 8 investigates
possible extensions of the framework: Subsection 8.1 deals with multi-lag dynamics of
the risk factors; Subsection 8.2 deals with the speciﬁc case where one of the Markov chains
coincides with the default state of a given entity and Subsection 8.4 shows how to introduce
rating-migration modeling in the framework. Section 9 concludes.
2. Information and historical dynamics
2.1. Information









t) where zt is a regime







N,t) is a set of speciﬁc multivariate factors xn,t associated with debtor n,
and d
￿
t =( d1,t,...,d N,t) is a set of binary variables indicating the default (dn,t =1 )o rt h e






t). At this stage, we do not make any assumption about the observability
of these variables by the econometrician (this is done below in Section 6). These regimes
inﬂuence bond pricing through diﬀerent channels (they will appear in the dynamics of
the risk factors yt and xn,t’s, in the stochastic discount factor and in the default-intensity
functions). In the baseline framework, the regimes are viewed as transitory: none of these
regimes is absorbing but this restriction is relaxed in a speciﬁc case presented in Subsection
8.2.
2.2. Historical dynamics
It is convenient to make the regime variable zt valued in {e1,...,e J}, the set of column vec-






= π (zt | zt−1,y t−1). (1)
The probability π(ej | ei,y t−1) that zt shifts from regime i to regime j between period
t − 1 and t, conditional on yt−1, is also denoted by πij,t−1. These speciﬁcations allow for
state-dependent transition probabilities, as in Gray (1996) [39], Ang and Bekaert (2002) [2]
or Dai, Singleton and Yang (2007) [19].
The conditional distribution of yt given zt and wt−1 is Gaussian and given by:
yt = µ(zt,z t−1)+Φ yt−1 +Ω( zt,z t−1)εt (2)
models, see e.g. Gordy (2000) [37].
6Other examples of term-structure models allowing for time-varying rating-migration probabilities include
Bielecki and Rutkowski (2000) [9] and Wei (2003) [61].
7Indeed, this implies that any function of the regimes taking the value fj in the j
th regime, say, is the
linear function of zt: f
￿zt with f
￿ =( f1 ...f J).
5where the εt are independently and identically N(0,I) distributed. Speciﬁcations (1) and
(2) imply that, in the universe (zt,y t), zt Granger-causes yt, yt causes zt and there is
instantaneous causality between zt and yt. Moreover, in the universe wt =( zt,y t,x t,d t),
(xt,d t) does not cause (zt,y t). As noted by Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2008) [3], instantaneous
causality between zt and yt implies that the variances of the factors yt, conditional on wt−1,
embed a jump term reﬂecting the diﬀerence in drifts µ accross regimes. Such a feature,
that allows for conditional heteroskedasticity, is absent from the Dai, Singleton and Yang
(2007) [19] setting. However, it should be noted that our framework nests the case where
there is no instantaneous causality between zt and yt in the historical dynamics.8 Contrary
to Bansal and Zhou (2002) [5], matrix Φ is not regime-dependent: this is for the sake of
tractability when it comes to bond pricing.9
The xn,t’s, n =1 ,...,N are assumed to be independent conditionally to (zt,y t,wt−1).
The conditional distribution of xn,t is Gaussian and deﬁned by:
xn,t = q1n (zt,z t−1)+Q2nyt + Q3nyt−1 + Q4nxn,t−1 + Q5n (zt,z t−1)ηn,t (3)
where the shocks ηn,t are IIN(0,I). Speciﬁcations (1), (2) and (3) imply that, in the uni-
verse (zt,y t,x n,t), (zt,y t) causes xn,t, xn,t does not cause (zt,y t) and there is instantaneous
causality between (zt,y t) and xn,t. Moreover, denoting by xn,t the vector xt excluding xn,t,
(xn,t,d t) does not cause (zt,y t,x n,t) in the whole universe wt.
Finally, the dn,t’s, n =1 ,...,N, are independent conditionally to (zt,y t,x t,wt−1) and
the conditional distribution of dn,t is such that:
p
￿




1 if dn,t−1 =1 ,
1 − exp(−λn,t) otherwise,
(4)







In other words, state 1 of dn,t is an absorbing state and exp(−λn,t) is the survival
probability. Since the default probability 1 − exp(−λn,t) is close to λn,t if λn,t is small,
λn,t is called the default intensity. The default intensity is expected to be postive, which is
not necessarily the case since the εt’s are Gaussian. However, the parameterization of the
model may make this extremely unfrequent.
So, in the universe (zt,y t,x n,t,d n,t), (zt,y t,x n,t) causes dn,t whereas dn,t does not causes
(zt,y t,x n,t) and there is instantaneous causality. In the whole universe wt, (xn,t,dn,t) does
not cause (zt,y t,x n,t,d n,t). The causality scheme is summarized in Figure 1.









Proposition 1. The conditional Laplace transform of (zt,y t) given wt−1 is:
ϕt−1 (u,v)=e x p
￿
v￿Φyt−1 +[ l1,...,l J]zt−1
￿
, (5)




uj + v￿µ(ej,e i)+1
2v￿Ω(ej,e i)Ω ￿ (ej,e i)v
￿
.
8Formally, this corresponds to µ(zt,z t−1)=µ(zt−1) and Ω(zt,z t−1)=Ω( zt−1).
9Indeed, the model of Bansal and Zhou (2002) [5] does not admit a closed-form exponential aﬃne solution
(they proceed by linearizing the discrete-time Euler equations and by solving the resulting linear relations
for prices).










































































v￿Φyt−1 +[ l1,...,l J]zt−1
￿
.
Using the expression given for the li’s leads to the result.
This Laplace transform is not, in general, exponential aﬃne in (zt−1,y t−1), since yt−1
appears in the πij,t’s. However, this is the case if the πij,t’s do not depend on yt−1 and then
(zt,y t) is Car(1) (see Darolles, Gourieroux and Jasiak, 2006[20] or Bertholon, Monfort and
Pegoraro (2008) [7] for in-depth presentations of Car processes).
3. Stochastic discount factor and risk-neutral dynamics
3.1. Stochastic discount factor
We complete the model by specifying the stochastic discount factor Mt−1,t between t − 1
and t:











(zt,z t−1,y t−1)ν (zt,z t−1,y t−1)+
+ν
￿








πij,t−1 exp[δj (ei,y t−1)] = 1, ∀i,yt−1, (7)











In our framework, the variables (xn,t,d n,t), speciﬁc to entity n, do not appear in the
stochastic discount factor. This means that these entities have no impact at the macroe-
conomic level.10 This can be formalised in the following way. Let us assume that the
N entities appearing in the modeling belong to a large population of size ˜ N. This large














Since the (xn,t,d n,t),i=1 ,..., ˜ N are independent conditonally to zt,y
t, we have, denoting































Assuming that the terms in the sum are bounded when ˜ N goes to inﬁnity, which means
that all the entities have a bounded weight in the inﬁnite population, Vt(Gt( ˜ N)) goes to
zero, when ˜ N goes to inﬁnity and Gt( ˜ N) converges in mean square to lim ˜ N→∞ Et(Gt( ˜ N))
(which is assumed to exist). Therefore, Gt( ˜ N) asymptotically depends only on (zt,y
t).
which already appears in Mt−1,t. In some sense, the impact of these entities has been
diversiﬁed away.
So the framework of this paper can be used in the context described above, the entities
appearing in the modeling are those of speciﬁc interest, and the sequential inference method
proposed in section 6 shows that these entities can be incorporated progressively in the
model.
3.2. Risk-neutral dynamics
3.2.1. The conditional risk-neutral distribution of (zt,y t) given wt−1





t−1 (exp[u￿zt + v￿yt]), and let us introduce the simpliﬁed notations:
µt = µ(zt,z t−1)
Ωt =Ω ( zt,z t−1), Σ(zt,z t−1)=Ω tΩ￿
t =Σ t
νt = ν (zt,z t−1,y t−1)
δt−1 = δ (zt−1,y t−1).
10Diversiﬁability assumptions and the implied restrictions on default risk premia are studied in details by
Jarrow, Lando and Yu (2005) [46] (in a continuous-time setting).
8Proposition 2. The conditional risk-neutral Laplace transform of (zt,y t) given wt−1 is:
ϕ
Q



















v￿µ(ej,e i)+uj + δj (ei,y t−1)
￿￿
.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
We immediately deduce the following Corollary.
Corollary 1. The risk-neutral dynamics of (zt,y t) is Car(1) if the s.d.f. satisﬁes the
constraints (for any i, j and t):
￿
π (ej | ei,y t−1)exp[δj (ei,y t−1)] = π∗
ij
Ω(ej,e i)ν (ej,e i,y t−1)= Φ ∗yt−1 + µ∗ (ej,e i),
(10)
where π∗
ij = π∗(ej | ei) does not depend on yt−1, Φ∗ is any matrix and µ∗ is any function.
If such constraints are satisﬁed, the risk-neutral conditional Laplace transform becomes:
ϕ
Q
t−1 (u,v)=e x p
￿
v￿ (Φ + Φ∗)yt−1 +
￿
A∗
















Comparing with equation (5), we deduce that the risk-neutral dynamics of (zt,y t) is then
deﬁned by:
yt = µ(zt,z t−1)+µ∗ (zt,z t−1)+( Φ+Φ ∗)yt−1 +Ω( zt,z t−1)ε∗
t, (12)
where, under Q, zt is an homogenous Markov chain deﬁned by the transition matrix {π∗
ij},
and ε∗
t –deﬁned by ε∗
t = εt − Ω−1 (zt,z t−1)[µ∗ (zt,z t−1)+Φ ∗yt−1]–i sIIN(0,I).
The previous results show that an appropriate choice of the s.d.f., that is an appropriate
choice of the risk sensitivity vectors ν and δ pricing respectively the (standardized) innov-
ations εt of yt and the regimes zt, allows to obtain a joint risk-neutral dynamics of (zt,y t)
deﬁned by any transition matrix {π∗
ij} and any equation:
yt =˜ µ(zt,z t−1)+˜ Φyt−1 +Ω( zt,z t−1)ε∗
t,
where ε∗
t is IIN(0,I).N o t et h a tt h eΩ function is the same in the historical and risk-neutral
worlds.
93.2.2. The risk-neutral distribution of (xt,d t) given (zt,y t,wt−1)






















(where f is the historical conditional p.d.f. of w1,t given wt−1)a n dt h ec o n d i t i o n a lr i s k -




is the same as the corresponding historical
distribution.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Since Mt−1,t is a function of (zt,y t) but not of (xt,d t), the previous lemma shows that




is the same as the historical one
and it is given by equations (3) and (4). In particular, the functional forms of the default
intensities λn,t are the same as in the historical world. Of course, since the dynamics of
(zt,y t) are diﬀerent in the two worlds, the same is true for the xn,t’s and the λn,t’s.
In addition, it can be shown that (zt,y t,x n,t) is Car(1) under the risk-neutral measure
(see Appendix A.3). However, it is not the case for (zt,y t,x n,t,d n,t).
It is also clear that the causality structure of the risk-neutral dynamics is similar to
the historical one, the only diﬀerence being the non-causality from yt to zt implied by the
homogeneity of the matrix {π∗
ij}.
3.3. Discussion of the constraints on the SDF
Constraints (10) can be written:
￿





ν (zt,z t−1,y t−1)= Ω −1 (zt,z t−1)[Φ ∗yt−1 + µ∗ (zt,z t−1)],
(13)
where the transition matrix {π∗
ij},t h em a t r i xΦ∗ and the vectors µ∗ (ej,e i) are arbitrary.
Note that constraints (7) imposed on δ are automatically satisﬁed by the parameterization
(13). Recall that constraints (10) are imposed so as to obtain a Car dynamics of the
state variable under the risk-neutral measure. These constraints could be relaxed, but at
the cost of losing the analytical tractability in the bond pricing (as will be shown below).
Even if we impose a Car risk-neutral dynamics, we still have a large number of degrees of
freedom in the speciﬁcation of the s.d.f. since Φ∗, µ∗(zt,z t−1) and the π∗
ij’s are then chosen
arbitrarily. However, we may wish to parameterize more parsimoniously the s.d.f. and,
therefore, impose stronger constraints on the risk-neutral dynamics. Let us illustrate this
point by a simple bivariate example.

















































which must be additive of the form Φ∗yt−1 + µ∗(zt,z t−1). It is only possible if b2 =0and





























2 are arbitrary. Finally, the risk-




























ij} where ˜ ϕ11, ˜ ϕ12, ˜ µ1, ˜ µ2 and the π*
ij’s are arbitrary, but the autoregressive
coeﬃcients of the second equations are the same as in the historical dynamics.
4. Pricing
4.1. Pricing of riskless zero-coupon bonds
It is well-known that the existence of a positive stochastic discount factor is equivalent to
the absence of arbitrage opportunities (see Hansen and Richard, 1987 [43] and Berholon,
Monfort and Pegoraro, 2007 [7]) and that the price at t of a zero-coupon bond with residual
maturity h is given by:
B (t,h)=E
Q
t [exp(−rt+1 − ...− rt+h)], (14)




1yt+i−1, i =1 ,...,h. Since (zt,y t) is Car(1) under Q, B(t,h) is
easily computed using the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Let us consider a multivariate Car(1) process Zt and its conditional Laplace
transform given by exp[a￿(s)Zt + b(s)].L e tu sf u r t h e rd e n o t eb yLt,h(ω) its multi-horizon






H−h+1Zt+1 + ...+ ω￿
HZt+h
￿￿
,t=1 ,...,T, h=1 ,...,H,
where ω =( ω￿
1,...,ω￿







where the sequences Ah, Bh, h =1 ,...,H are obtained recursively by:
Ah = a(ωH−h+1 + Ah−1)
Bh = b(ωH−h+1 + Ah−1)+Bh−1,
with the initial conditions A0 =0and B0 =0 .
11Proof. See Appendix A.4.
From Equation (11) we know that (zt,y t) is risk-neutral Car(1) and that its conditional









so we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3. We have:




































where the sequence ωh, h =1 ,...,H is deﬁned by ωH =0 , ω1 = ω2 = ... = ωH−1 =
(−a￿
1,−b￿
1)￿ and where a￿(u,v)=[ ( A∗
1(u,v),...,A ∗
J(u,v)),v￿(Φ + Φ∗)].
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
4.2. Pricing of (zero-recovery-rate) defaultable bonds
A defaultable zero-coupon bond providing one money unit at t + h if entity n is still alive






exp(−rt+1 − ...− rt+h)I{dn,t+h=0}
￿
(17)
if dn,t =0and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 4. The price of a zero-recovery-rate zero-coupon defaultable bond issued by
































exp(−rt+1 − ...− rt+h)I{dn,t+h=0} | zt+h,y






exp(−rt+1 − ...− rt+h)Q
￿
dn,t+h =0| zt+h,y














t+h,x n,t+h,d n,t+i−1 =0
￿









t+i,x n,t+i,d n,t+i−1 =0
￿
=e x p ( −λn,t+i).
where the last equality comes from the fact that the conditional historical and risk-neutral
distributions of dn,t are the same (see Subsection 3.2.2).
It can be shown (see Appendix A.3) that (zt,y t,x n,t) is Car(1) under Q, with a conditional
Laplace transform of the type exp[a￿(u,v,w)(z￿
t,y￿
t,x ￿
n,t)] where a(u,v,w)=[ (˜ A1,..., ˜ AJ),(v￿+
w￿Q2n)(Φ + Φ∗)+w￿Q3n,w￿Q4n], where




ij exp{uj +( v￿ + w￿Q2n)[µ(ej,e i)+µ∗ (ej,e i)] + w￿q1n (ej,e i)+
1
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Therefore we have the following result:
Proposition 5. The price of a zero-recovery-rate zero-coupon defaultable bond issued by
debtor n is given by:
BD





















































where the sequence ωh, h =1 ,...,H is deﬁned by ωH =( −α￿
n,−β￿
n,−γ￿






n) for h =1 ,...,H− 1,w i t hcn,0 = a1, fn,0 = b1, gn,0 =0 .
11Ap r o c e s sXt does not cause Yt in Granger’s sense if and only if, for any t, Yt is independent of
(Xt−1,...,X 1) conditionally on (Yt−1,...,Y 1).T h i s i s e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e n o n - c a u s a l i t y i n S i m s ’ s e n s e
(Xt does not cause the stochastic process Yt in Sims’ sense iﬀ Xt is independent from(Yt+1,Y t+2,...,Y T)
conditionally on (Yt,X t−1,Yt−1,...,X 1,Y 1)).
13Proof. See Appendix A.6.
In this setting, credit spreads are given by:
sn(t,h)=RD














Equations (15), (20) and (21) show that yields and spreads are given by some com-
binations of discrete and real-valued factors, the latter following Markov-Switching vector
autoregressive models deﬁned by equations (2) and (3). Therefore, yields and spreads
present (conditional and unconditional) distributions that can be far richer than the Gaus-
sian ones that would be obtained in the absence of regime-switching. This will be illustrated
in a numerical example below (subsection 4.4).
4.3. Pricing of non-zero-recovery-rate defaultable bonds




t [exp(−rt+1 − ...− rt+h − λn,t+1 − ...− λn,t+h)], (22)
has been obtained under the assumption of zero recovery rate. This formula can be extended
to the case with non-zero recovery rates, providing that the λn,t’s are interpreted as risk-
neutral “recovery-adjusted” default intensities. More precisely, we have the following result
(dropping the subscript n for the sake of clarity):
Proposition 6. If, for any bond issued by debtor n before t,t h er e c o v e r yp a y o ﬀ– t h a ti s
assumed to be paid at time t in case of default between t−1 and t of debtor n–i se q u a lt ot h e
product of a function ζn,t of the information available at time t by the survival-contingent






exp(−rt+h − ...− rt+h − ˜ λn,t+1 − ...− ˜ λn,t+h)
￿
, (23)
where ˜ λn,s is deﬁned by (for any s):
exp(−˜ λn,s)=e x p ( −λn,s)+( 1− exp(−λn,s))ζn,s.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
The assumption of Proposition 6 is similar to the “Recovery of Market Value” assumption
made by Duﬃe and Singleton (1999) [28] except that, in their discrete-time approach, they
assume that ζt is known at time t − 1, and that conditionally to the information at t − 1,
dn,t is independent of the recovery payoﬀ at t.
144.4. Numerical example
This subsection proposes a simple numerical experiment to illustrate some properties of the
model.
Let us consider a model with two regimes. Whereas the ﬁrst regime (zt =[ 1 ,0]￿) cor-
responds to “normal times”, the second (zt =[ 0 ,1]￿) is intended to capture crisis periods.
Table 1 deﬁnes the dynamics of macroeconomic and regime variables. A ﬁrst macroeco-
nomic variable, denoted by yr,t, follows an AR(1) with innovation εt ∼ NIID(0,1).A
second macroeconomic variables, denoted by yz,t, is deterministic conditionally to zt. This
variable acts like a memory of past crisis periods. Intuitively, if it was inﬁnitely persist-




zt + yz,t−1), yz,t would count the number of past crisis
periods. The crisis regime is far more persistent under the risk-neutral measure than under
the historical one: under the former measure, the life expectancy of the crisis regime is
4 periods while it is of 100 periods under the latter measure. The short rate is given by
rt+1 =0 .04 + yr,t.
Table 1 – Dynamics under both measures
Under P Under Q
Dynamics of yr,t =0 .6yr,t−1 + εt yr,t =0 .3+0 .8yr,t−1 + εt






















Let us consider two ﬁrms. These ﬁrms are characterized by their respective default





















[ yr,t yz,t ]￿.
Both types of ﬁrms are aﬀected during crises but not in the same manner. Speciﬁcally,
whereas the default intensity of ﬁrm 1 depends directly on zt, the eﬀect of the crisis on
the default intensity of ﬁrm 2 works through yz,t. The upper panel of Figure 2 displays a
simulated sample of (zt,y r,t,y z,t). The lower panel shows the implied default intensities. It
turns out that the default intensity of ﬁrm 2 reacts in a more progressive but also in a more
persistent manner to crisis events than the default intensity of ﬁrm 1.
15Figure 2: Simulation of default intensities for the two types of ﬁrms
Notes:T h e ﬁ g u r e d i s p l a y s s i m u l a t e d t r a j e c t o r i e s o f t h e m a c r o e c o n o m i c f a c t o r syr,t and yz,t (upper panel) and of the
associated default intensities for the two types of ﬁrms (lower panel). The grey-shaded areas indicate crisis periods (second
regime zt =[ 01 ]).
Figure 3 shows the yield curves for both ﬁrms when yr,t is equal to its unconditional
mean (zero) and when yz,t−1 =0 . As expected, for all maturities, yields are higher in the
crisis regime (grey solid lines) than in the normal-times regime (black solid lines). The
plots also report the yield curves that would be observed if the representative investor were
risk-neutral or, equivalently, if the risk-neutral measure were identical to the historical one
(dashed lines). The yield diﬀerentials between solid lines and dashed lines correspond to
risk premia. These premia are particularly high in the crisis regime and for ﬁrm 2. Indeed,
recall that the crisis regime is very persistent under the risk-neutral measure. Accordingly,
there is a high risk-neutral probability –compared to the historical probability– that the
crisis regime continues in the next periods. Since the default intensity of ﬁrm 2 depends on
yz,t, that itself depends on the number of crisis periods, the risk-neutral expectations of the
default intensity increases with maturity. This generates the strong steepness of the yield
curve for ﬁrm 2 under the crisis regime (grey solid line).
16Figure 3: Yield curves for both types of ﬁrms and under both regimes
Notes:T h es o l i dl i n e sr e p r e s e n ty i e l dc u r v e so b s e r v e dw h e nyr,t =0and yz,t−1 =0 .I ft h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ei n v e s t o rw e r e
risk neutral or, equivalently, if the risk-neutral dynamics were identical to the historical ones, the yield curves would be
given by the dashed lines.
With such a model, one can perform many exercises, one of them being the computation
the distribution of returns provided by various portfolios of defaultable and/or risk-free
bonds. Let us consider an investor that wants to invest a given amount over, say, the next
ﬁve years (between time t and time t+5). Assume that she wants to compare three speciﬁc
strategies:
• Strategy 0: Purchase of 5-year risk-free zero-coupon bonds (hold till maturity),
• Strategy 1: In period t, purchase of 10-year risk-free zero-coupon bonds and sale of
those bonds in t +5 ,
• Strategy 2.a and 2.b: Purchase of 10-year defaultable bonds (issued by ﬁrm 1 in
Strategy 2.a and issued by ﬁrm 2 in Strategy 2.b) and sale of those bonds in t +5 .
Whereas the return provided by Strategy 0 is known ex ante (it is given by the 5-year
risk-free yields), the returns associated with the other strategies are uncertain. As regards
Strategy 1, uncertainty stems from the fact the price of a 5-year risk-free zero-coupon bond
in t +5years is not known at time t. For Strategies 2.a and 2.b, additional uncertainty
comes from the possible default of the indebted ﬁrms. Figure 4 displays the distributions of
the returns of these strategies. It turns out that, conditionally on the absence of default of
ﬁrm 2, the return distribution is bi-modal: most of the lower returns (below 3%) correspond
to drawings for which the crisis regime prevails at time t +5 , implying low prices for the
bonds issued by ﬁrm 2 (as can be seen on Figure 3).
17Figure 4: (Annualized) Returns provided by investment Strategies 0, 1, 2.a and 2.b
Notes:T h e r e t u r n d i s t r i b u t i o n s a r e o b t a i n e d b y s i m u l a t i n g 2 0 . 0 0 0 5 - y e a r s c e n r i o s .I n i t i a l l y , yr,t =0 , yz,t =0and
zt =[ 1 ,0]￿.T h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f S t r a t e g y - 0 r e t u r n s i s a D i r a c m a s s a t R(t,5).T h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f S t r a t e g y - 1 r e t u r n s i s
represented in light grey (in black for those yielded by Strategy 2). Returns are logarithmic. Strategies-2 distributions do
not include defaults events (but the proportion of defaults is reported in brackets).
5. Internal consistency (IC) conditions
5.1. IC conditions based on riskless yields
If the short rate rt+1 is a component of yt, for instance the ﬁrst one, we have to impose




1yt is equal to the ﬁrst
component of yt,t h a ti s :
a1 =0 , b1 = ￿ e1,
where ￿ ei is the vector selecting the ith component of yt.
Moreover, if another component of yt, for instance the second one, is equal to a riskless









the second component of yt,t h a ti s
￿
ah0 =0
bh0 = h0˜ e2.
5.2. IC conditions based on defaultable yields
Similarly, if the ﬁrst component of xn,t is a defaultable yield with residual maturity h0,






gn,h0 = h0ˆ e1.
where ˆ ei denotes the vector selecting the ith component of xn,t.
5.3. IC conditions based on asset returns
If the ﬁrst component of yt is the geometric return of a market index, we have to impose
exp(−rt+1)E
Q
t (exp(y1,t+1)) = 1.
18Using equation (11), this gives
￿
A∗
1,0 ... A ∗
J,0
￿

















, µ1 and µ∗
1 being the
ﬁrst components of µ and µ∗ respectively, σ2
1 being the (1,1) entry of Σ and Φ1 and Φ∗
1 the







1,0 ... A ∗
J,0
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is linear in zt,y t,x n,t and the IC constraint follows.
6. Inference
6.1. Observability













2,n,t)￿,t h a tz1t,y 1t,x 1,n,t are observed by the econometrician and z2t,y 2t and
x2,n,t are not. Typically, z1,t and z2,t will be two regime processes valued respectively in
E1 = {e1,...,e J1} and E2 = {e1,...,e J2} so zt will be equal to z1,t ⊗z2,t, where ⊗ denotes
the Kronecker product operator. The implementation of the following estimation strategy
requires that the transition probabilities do not depend on the unobserved vectors y2,t−1.12
Moreover, we assume that we observe at each date t a vector of risk-free yields denoted by
Rt and, for each obligor n, a vector of defaultable yields denoted by RD
n,t.N o t et h a ti fs o m e
yields are included in the vectors yt or xn,t, they do not enter the vectors Rt and RD
n,t (see
Section 5). The period of observation is {1,...,T}.
6.2. Decomposition of the joint p.d.f. and estimation strategy
Let us denote by θzy the vector of parameters deﬁning the historical dynamics of (zt,y t),b y
θx
n the vector of parameters deﬁning the conditional p.d.f. of xn,t given zt,y
t,x n,t−1 and by
θd
n the vector of parameters deﬁning the conditional p.d.f. of dn,t given zt,y
t,x n,t,d n,t−1.











































The parameters appearing in Mt−1,t are denoted by θ∗. The theoretical values of Rt and
RD







sequential strategy of estimation is the following:
1. Estimate θzy and θ∗ from the osbervations of y1t,z 1t,R t, t =1 ,...,T.
2. Estimate the θx
n’s and the θd
n’s from the observations of x1n,t and RD
n,t, t =1 ,...,T,
taking as given the values of θzy and θ∗, and the values of y2,t and z2,t being ﬁxed at
the approximated values obtained from step 1.
The remaining of the current section details these two steps. The methodology that is
proposed builds on the so-called inversion technique developed by Chen and Scott (1993)
[15]. This technique is adapted in order to accomodate regime switching.
6.3. Estimation of the parameters (θzy,θ ∗)
Using equation (16), we have, with obvious notations:
Rt (θzy,θ∗)=Azt + B1y1,t + B2y2,t.








where R2,t is of dimension
m. With obvious notations, we get:






















˜ yt = ˜ Byt + ˜ Azt
and
yt = ˜ B−1
￿
˜ yt − ˜ Azt
￿
and from equation (2) we get:
˜ B−1
￿














˜ yt−1 − ˜ Azt−1
￿￿
+ ˜ BΩ(zt,z t−1)εt
20or




˜ µ(zt,z t−1)= ˜ Azt + ˜ Bµ(zt,z t−1) − ˜ BΦ ˜ B−1 ˜ Azt−1
˜ Φ= ˜ BΦ ˜ B−1
˜ Ω(zt,z t−1)= ˜ BΩ(zt,z t−1).
The conditional distribution of ˜ yt given zt, ˜ y
t−1,i ss i m i l a rt ot h a to fyt given zt, ˜ yt−1,
and in particular is Gaussian, the diﬀerence being that ˜ yt is fully observable. Assuming
moreover that the R1,t are observed with Gaussian errors we get, with obvious notations:
R1,t = A1zt + B11y1,t + B12y2,t + ξt
= A1zt + B11y1,t
+B12B−1
22 (R2t − A2zt − B21y1,t)+ξt, (25)





Putting equations (24),(25) and (1) together, we have a dynamic model in which the only
latent variables are z2,t and which can be estimated by the maximum likelihood methods
using Hamilton’s approach (see Appendix B for the case when some regime variables are







From the inversion method of 6.3, we can get approximations of the y2,t’s and smoothing




1 z1,t + Cn
2 z2,t + Dn
1y1,t + Dn
2y2,t + Fn
1 x1,n,t + Fn
2 x2,n,t. (26)
and using equations (2), (3) and (26) and replacing y2,t and z2,t by their approximations,
we get a system in which the only latent variables are the x2,n,t.T a k i n gθzy and θ∗ as given,
the parameters θx
n and θd
n can be estimated either by an inversion technique or by Kalman
ﬁltering, taking into account IC conditions.
Note that in this strategy, the observable variables dn,t’s have not been used. If the
recovery rate was eﬀectively zero, λn,t would be the default intensity and the conditonal
p.d.f. of dn,t given zt,y
t,x n,t,d n,t−1 would be:
dn,tdn,t−1 +( 1− dn,t−1)exp[−(1 − dn,t)λn,t] × [1 − exp(−λn,t)]
dn,t .
This p.d.f. could be incorporated in the likelihood function. However, in the more realistic
case of non-zero recovery rate, we have seen that (see Subsection 4.3) the λn,t’s must be
interpreted as risk-neutral “recovery adjusted” default intensities and, therefore, they cannot
be used for describing the historical dynamics of the dn,t’s.
13Note that this algorithm can handle time-varying transition probabilities (which is required in the case
where the πij’s depend on y1,t−1).
14Note that in the inversion method, the z2t are replaced by those states presenting the highest smoothed
probabilities.
216.5. Possible adaptations of the estimation strategy
Mainly for the sake of presentation clarity, the ﬁrst step of the sequential strategy presented
above involves only observations of macroeconomic factors and riskless yields. In particular,
no credit-spread data are used in the estimation of θ∗, the parameters appearing in the s.d.f.
Mt−1,t as well as in the estimation of the unobserved factors y2,t and of the unobserved
regimes z2,t. However, spread data may contain useful information for the estimation of
θzy and of θ∗. In that case, the strategy should be adapted in order to include credit-
spread data in the ﬁrst step of the estimation. It can be seen that the main lines of the
estimation strategy are not aﬀected when the vector Rt and y1,t considered in the ﬁrst
step are respectively augmented with observed defaultable-bond yields and with observable
speciﬁc factor x1,n,t (that are associated with the additional yields).15
Another adaptation of the strategy would be the following. The ﬁrst step presented
above implies a nesting of recursive computations of the theoretical formulas giving riskless
(or risky) rates and recursive computation of the Kitagawa-Hamilton algorithms, which
could be time-consuming. In order to alleviate the computational cost it is possible, for
instance, to estimate ﬁrst system (24) –or an analogue system including risky rates– with
unconstrained parameters, using standard Kitagawa-Hamilton ﬁlter, and then to compute
smoothed estimates values of the zt’s. The latter values of zt would further be considered
as observations and the remaining steps would estimate all the parameters (except the ones
appearing in the πij,t’s) using either inversion techniques or the Kalman ﬁlter.
7. Liquidity risk
There is compelling evidence that yields and spreads contain components that are closely
linked to liquidity.16 The estimation of the liquidity premium is of concern for several
reasons. For instance, gauging the liquidity-risk premium provides policy makers –central
bankers in particular– with insights on the valuation of liquidity by the markets (see Taylor
and Williams, 2008 [60], Wu, 2008 [62] or Michaud and Upper, 2008 [56]). Furthermore, if
one wants to extract default probabilities from market data, one has to distinguish between
what is related to default and what is caused by the liquidity of the considered bonds.
However, the identiﬁcation of the liquidity premium, that is, distinguishing between the
default-related and the liquidity-related components of yield spreads, remains a challenging
task. Empirical evidence points to the existence of commonality amongst the liquidity
components of prices of diﬀerent bonds (see e.g. Fontaine and Garcia, 2009 [34]). Therefore,
the identiﬁcation of the liquidity component relies on the ability to exhibit risk factors that
reﬂects liquidity valuation. Liu, Longstaﬀ and Mandell (2006) [52] and Feldhütter and
Lando (2008) [31] develop aﬃne term-structure models where a liquidity factor is latent
and the identiﬁcation is based on assumptions regarding the relative liquidity of diﬀerent
interest-rate instruments.17 Alternatively, the liquidity factor could be proxied by some
observable factors.18 One may resort to intermediate –or mixed– approach, where part
15Naturally, the dimension of R2t should still be equal to the number of unobserved macro-factors y2t.
16The inﬂuence of liquidity eﬀects on bond pricing has been investigated, amongst others, by Longstaﬀ
(2004) [53], Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) [14], Covitz and Downing (2007) [18].
17In both studies, the liquidity factor that is estimated corresponds to the so-called “convenience yield”,
that can be seen as a premium that one is willing to pay when holding Treasuries. This premium stems
from various features of Treasury securities, such as repo specialness (see Feldhütter and Lando, 2008).
18Amon which: bid-ask spreads, market-depth measures, bond supply, spread between bonds of the same
maturity but with diﬀerent ages or spread between oﬀ-the-run and on-the -run Treasuries (see, e.g.,
Longstaﬀ, 2004[53] or Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz, 2009 [6]). More generally, for credit spread determ-
22of the liquidity-factor dynamics is observable (through observed proxies) and part of it is
latent.
Let us come back to our modeling framework. We have seen in section 4 that incorpo-
rating default risk in the pricing methodology implies to replace the short rate rt+1 by a
“default-adjusted” short-rate rt+1 +λn,t+1. Besides, in order to take into account recovery-
rate eﬀects, λn,t+1 can be seen as a “recovery adjusted” default intensity between t and t+1














As suggested by Duﬃe and Singleton (1999) [28], intensity-based model can also account
for liquidity eﬀects by introducing a stochastic process that is interpreted as the carrying
cost of non-liquid defaultable securities. This process then appears alongside the default
intensity in the spread between the “pure” –i.e. default and liquidity-adjusted– short rate
and the short rate associated with a defaultable bond. The aﬃne term-structure literature is
relatively silent on the interpretation or the microfoundations of the illiquidity intensity. In
a theoretical paper analyzing interactions between credit and liquidity risks, He and Xiong
(2011) [44] show that such an illiquidity intensity may reﬂect the probability of occurence of
a liquidity shock; upon the arrival of ths shock, the bond investor has to exit by selling his
bond at a fractional cost (i.e. the selling price is equal to a fraction of the price that would
have prevailed in the absence of the liquidity shock); the fractional cost is the analogous to
the fractional loss (1 − ζ) in the default case (see also Ericsson and Renault, 2006 [30] for
a similar interpretation). Accordingly, let us introduce an “illiquidty intensity” between t
and t +1 , denoted with λL
n,t+1.I fλn,t+1 and λL











n zt+1 + βL￿
n yt+1 + γL￿
n xn,t+1,
we could price not only riskless bonds Bn (t,h) and defaultable bonds BD
n (t,h) as above,
but also bonds facing liquidity risk BL
n (t,h) and bonds facing both default and liquidity
risk BDL
n (t,h). We would have:

     
     
B (t,h)= E
Q























−rt+1 − λn,t+1 − λL




In the context of a Car(1) risk-neutral dynamics of (zt,y t,x n,t), these prices are expo-
nential linear in (zt,y t,x n,t) and the corresponding yields are linear in (zt,y t,x n,t).
If the obligors issue only bonds facing both default and liquidity risks, and if the same
factors aﬀect both kinds of intensities, it is not possible to distinguish between the two
of them. In order to operate –or to gain some insights on– a decomposition between the
default intensity on the one hand and the liquidity intensity on the other, one has to rely
on additional assumptions. For instance, these assumptions may reﬂect some priors about
the relative eﬀects of the risk factors on the diﬀerent obligors or on the diﬀerent types of
securities (as in Liu, Longstaﬀ and Mandell (2006) [52] and Feldhütter and Lando (2008)
[31]).
inants, see e.g., Elton (2001) [29] or Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) [17].
238. Model extensions
8.1. Multi-lag dynamics for yt and xn,t processes
The model can easily be extended to allow for yt and xn,t dynamics that include several lags.
In particular, when observed data are used in the estimation process –the y1,t and x1,n,t
deﬁned in Section 6–, preliminary analysis of the data could point to the need of taking
diﬀerent lags into account to model the historical dynamics of these variables. The ﬂexibility
in the choice of the lag structure constitutes an advantage of working in discrete-time over
most continuous-time models (see, e.g., Monfort and Pegoraro, 2007 [57] or Gourieroux,
Monfort and Polimenis, 2006 [38]).
Equations (2) and (3) imply that the multivariate factors yt and xt follow auto-regressive
process of order one. However, to the extent that a VAR(p) amounts to a VAR(1) once the
last p lags of the endogenous variable are stacked in the same vector, the pricing techniques
of the bonds –namely equations (16) and (20)– are not aﬀected if yt and xt follow VAR(p).
However, in order to make the estimation strategy presented in Section 6 still eﬀective –in
particular regarding inversion techniques–, the unobserved vector variables y2,t and x2,n,t
should not enter equations (2) and (3) with lags larger than one. To the extent that this
restriction only applies to the unobserved factors –for which insights on the appropriate
distributions are a priori not readily available– such a constraint is not really restrictive.
8.2. Interpretation of a regime as the default state of an entity
In this subsection, we consider the speciﬁc case where one the Markov chain included in
zt corresponds to the default state of a given entity.19 The speciﬁcity of that situation
lies in the fact that the default of this entity then enters the s.d.f.. Therefore, we leave
the framework described in Subsection 3.1 where all defaultable entities were small enough
to have no impact at the macroeconomic level. As a consequence, the “zero” entity may
represent a whole industry or a very big institution. This could be extended to a few major
entities but one has to bear in mind that increasing their number results in an exponential
growth in the dimension of zt.
The fact that this default enter the s.d.f. results in a new component in bond prices: a
compensation for investors risk-aversion towards the default event of entity zero. As pointed
out by Yu (2002) [63] and Jarrow, Lando and Yu (2005) [46], such components arise only
when the default-event risk is not diversiﬁable.
As mentioned in Section 1, this interpretation is also linked with previous studies at-
tempting to introduce contagion eﬀects in aﬃne term-structure models. Indeed, the default
of entity zero may lead to a simultaneous increase in the default intensities of any other
debtor (through the regime variable zt that may enter all default intensities).
For sake of simplicity, let us assume that such a crisis variable is the only regime captured
by zt, which can be observable or not. In this case, assuming that the state e2 =( 0 ,1)
￿ is
the absorbing crisis state, we have:
π (e2 | e2,y t−1)=1
π (e1 | e2,y t−1)=0 .
Moreover, we could specify:
π (e1 | e1,y t−1)=e x p( −λ0,t−1),
19We can deal with several Markov chains by writing vector zt as a Kronecker product of several chains.
24with λ0,t−1 = α0 + β￿
0y1,t−1. In this case, λ0,t−1 can be interpreted as a systemic-risk
intensity. Conditions (10) {π (ej | ei,y t−1)exp[δj (ei,y t−1)] = π∗
ij} imply the followings:
• π∗
21 =0 , π∗
22=1, δ1 (e2,y t−1) is undeﬁned, δ2 (e2,y t−1)=0and, therefore, δ￿ (e2,y t−1)zt =
0.
• exp[δ1 (e1,y t−1)] = π∗
11 exp(λ0,t−1) or δ1 (e1,y t−1) = logπ∗
11 + α0 + β￿
0yt−1.
• exp[δ2 (e1,y t−1)] = (1 − π∗
11)[1− exp(−λ0,t−1)]
−1,o rδ2 (e1,y t−1) = log(1 − π∗
11) −
log[1 − exp(−α0 − β￿
0yt−1)].
Denoting π∗
11 =e x p ( −λ∗
0), λ∗
0 being the systemic-risk intensity in the risk-neutral world,
we get:
δ1 (e1,y t−1)=λ0,t−1 − λ∗
0
δ2 (e1,y t−1) = log[1 − exp(−λ∗
0)] − log[1 − exp(−λ0,t−1)]
￿ log(λ∗
0) − log(λ0,t−1) if λ∗
0,λ 0,t−1 are small.
In particular, the risk-neutral intensity λ∗
0 and the historical intensityλ0,t−1 are diﬀerent




















will be diﬀerent functions of yt (and of xnt for RD
n (t,h)) before and after the systemic crisis.
The term structure of the impact of the systemic crisis will be:
￿
a2,h − a1,h for the riskless yield of residual maturity h,
c2,n,h − c1,n,h for the defaultable yield of residual maturity h, for the nthentity.
8.3. A sector-contagion model
8.3.1. General approach
In this subsection, we propose another speciﬁc use of the regimes that makes it possible
to model sector-contagion phenomena. As explained in the introduction, our assumptions
prevent us from making the default intensity of any entity depend on the default event of
other entitities. In other words, the baseline framework does not allow us to account for
contagion at the debtor level (except in the speciﬁc case presented in 8.2). Nevertheless, as
shown here, this can be done at a sector level, the sectors representing for instance diﬀerent
industries or diﬀerent geographical areas.
Speciﬁcally, in this model, each debtor belongs to one of the sectors. At each period, a
sector is either “infected” or not infected. When a sector is infected, the default intensities
of its consituent entities tend to be higher. Let us denote by Si,t the state the ith sector
at time t: Si,t is equal to [1,0]￿ if the ith sector is infected at time t, and is equal to [0,1]￿
otherwise. If we have NS sectors, then we have to consider 2NS regimes, the regime variable
zt being given by:
zt = S1,t ⊗ S2,t ⊗ ...⊗ SNS,t
25where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. In such a model, one can make the default
intensity of any ﬁrm depend on the state of the sectors (and, in particular, on the state
of its own sector). Further, the sector-contagion phenomena can be obtained through the
speciﬁcations of the regime-transition matrix. Indeed, this matrix contains the probabilities
that any sector gets infected (or cured) given the states of the other sectors.
8.3.2. Numerical example
In this example, the risk-free short-term rate rt+1 has the same historical and risk-neutral
dynamics of as in 4.4. We consider three homogeneous sectors. The probability that a sector
gets cured/infected at time t depends on the number of infected sectors at the previous
period. In that case, the regime-transition matrix is deﬁned by a set of probabilities like
the one reported in Table 2. In our example, the probability of getting infected is far higher
when at least one sector is already infected than when none of them is infected.
Table 2 – Probabilities of getting infected/cured
Number of infected sectors (
￿
i[0,1] × Si,t) 0123
Probability of getting infected (in t +1 )0 . 2 5 % 1 0 %1 0 % N A
Probability of getting cured (in t +1 )N A 1 0 % 1 0 % 1 0 %
The default intensities of sector-i ﬁrms are given by:
λi,t =0 .01 + 0.02 × I{Si
t=1} +0 .02 × I{S1
t =1}I{S2
t =1}I{S3
t =1} +0 .002yr,t,
which implies that the default intensity of a Sector-i entity increases by two percentage
points when Sector i gets infected and increases by an additional two percentage points if
all sectors become infected simultaneously.
26Figure 5: Simulated sample of the sector-contagion model
Notes: Each panel corresponds to one sector. There are 600 debtors in the portfolio (200 per sector). The vertical bars
represent the number of ﬁrms that have defaulted during the considered period. At the end of each period, defaulted ﬁrms
are replaced by new ones (of the same sector). Grey-shaded areas indicate periods during which the considered sector is
in distress. Darker areas indicate periods when all three sectors are in distress.
Let us now consider a portfolio of 600 debtors, with 200 debtors in each sector. Figure
5 shows a simulation of the timing of defaults for this portfolio. Each panel corresponds
to one of the three sectors. At one point, Sector 1 gets infected (see the grey area in the
ﬁrst panel of Figure5). While the default intensities of Sector-2 and Sector-3 ﬁrms are not
contemporaneously impacted by the infection of the ﬁrst sector, 5-year default probabilities
of Sector-2 and Sector-3 ﬁrms shift upwards. This is accounted for by the fact that once
Sector 1 is infected, the probability that Sector 2 and Sector 3 get infected over the next
periods is higher. A few periods later, Sector 3 and then Sector 2 get infected.
8.4. Modeling credit-rating transitions
In their seminal study of credit spread, Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) [45] model
rating transitions as a time-homogenous Markov chain. That is, in their model, whether
a ﬁrm’s rating will change in the next period depends on its current rating only and the
probability of changing from one rating to the other remains the same over time. Diﬀerent
studies suggest however that –per-period– transition probabilities are time-varying (see e.g.
Lucas and Lonski, 1992 [54] or Feng, Gourieroux and Jasiak, 2008 [32]).
In the present subsection, we show how our framework can be adapted in order to account
explicitly for rating migration. Building on Lando’s (1998) [50] approach (see also Feld-
hütter and Lando, 2008 [31]), the structure accomodates a time-varying rating-migration
27matrix while allowing diﬀerent ratings to respond in a correlated yet diﬀerent fashion to
the same change in the general economic conditions. The time variability of the rating-
migration probabilities results from Gaussian shocks as well as from regime shifts.
8.4.1. Adaptation of the framework
While most of the previous framework is still valid, some changes regard the modeling of
the default intensity. Speciﬁcally, the historical dynamics of (zt,y t,x n,t), as well as the s.d.f.
speciﬁcations are still given by equations (1), (2), (3) and (6). However, in this adapted
framework, each ﬁrm n is also characterized by a credit-rating process, denoted by τn,t.F o r
any ﬁrm n and period t, τn,t can take one of K values: the ﬁrst K − 1 values correspond
to credit ratings and the Kth corresponds to the default state.20 Like the dn,t’s, the τn,t’s,
n =1 ,...,N, are independent conditionally to(zt,y t,x t,wt−1).I n a d d i t i o n , w e a s s u m e
that the rating transition probabilities, for ﬁrm n and from period t − 1 to period t,i sa
function of (zt,y t,x n,t). Accordingly, this transition matrix is denoted with Π(zt,y t,x n,t)
and we have:
P(τn,t = j | τn,t−1 = i)=Π i,j(zt,y t,x n,t),
where Πi,j(zt,y t,x n,t),t h e(i,j) entry of Π(zt,y t,x n,t), represents the actual probability of
going from state i to state j in one time step. Each of these entries must be in [0,1] and




eigenvector of Π(zt,y t,x n,t) associated with the eigenvalue 1. In addition, the default state





In this context, a defaultable zero-coupon bond providing one money unit at t + h if
entity n is still alive in t + h and zero otherwise has a price, in period t, that is given by






exp(−rt+1 − ...− rt+h)I{τn,t+h<K}
￿
. (27)
In order to keep a quasi-explicit formula for defaultable zero-coupon bonds, we assume
that Π(zt,y t,x n,t) admits the diagonal representation:
Π(zt,y t,x n,t)=V.Ψ(zt,y t,x n,t).V −1,
where the columns of V are the eigenvectors of Π(zt,y t,x n,t) and constitute a basis in RK
and Ψ(zt,y t,x n,t) is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues that are positive and smaller than

























xn,t+h,τ n,t = i
￿
the probability of defaulting before t+h corresponds to the entry (i,K) of
20For instance, rating 1 can be the highest (Aaa in Moody’s rankings) and K−1 can be the lowest (C in
Moody’s rankings). In addition, we have, dn,t = I(τn,t = K) .
21The fact that the eigenvalues have a modulus smaller than one is necessary in the case of time-homogenous
Markov chain processes.
28the matrix that is given by:
V.Ψ(zt+1,y t+1,x n,t+1)...Ψ(zt+h,y t+h,x n,t+h).V −1.
This probability is therefore given by:
P(τn,t+h = K | zt+h,y












where Vi,j and V −1
i,j are the entries (i,j) of , respectively,V and V −1. Since Vi,KV −1
K,K =1
(see Appendix C) using ψK ≡ 0, we get:
P(τn,t+h <K| zt+h,y












If the eigenvalues ψj are some linear combinations of (zt,y t,x n,t),E q u a t i o n s( 2 7 )a n d
(28) imply that the price of a bond is a sum of K −1 multi-horizon Laplace tranforms. As
a consequence, the bond prices can be obtained using the algorithm presented in Lemma 2.
However, it should be noted that in this context, the prices are no longer exponential aﬃne
in the factors, which implies in particular that the Kalman ﬁlter has to be adapted so as to
accomodate the nonlinearity of the state-space measurement equations. In such a context,
Feldhütter and Lando (2008) [31] use the extended Kalman ﬁlter. As an alternative, the
unscented Kalman ﬁlter can be implemented.
8.4.2. Numerical example
Let us consider again the processes rt and zt as speciﬁed in 4.4. In the present model, the


















In order to get plausible plausible matrices, the ﬁrst-regime calibration –that involves the
αi,1’s– is based on the one-year-average rating-migration matrix for European corporates
provided by Moody’s (Moody’s, 2010 [59]). This matrix is reported in Table 3. The spectral
decomposition of this matrix provides us with the matrix of eigenvectors V . The eigenvalues
are real and comprised between 0 and 1. Accordingly, they are of the form exp(−αi,1). The
αi,1 are reported in Table 4. The deﬁnition of the second regime requires a second set of
αi’s, denoted by {αi,2}i=1...K−1. We calibrate the latter in order to have 5-year default
probabilities that are higher than those obtained with the ﬁrst-regime transition matrix
(see Table 4).22 Finally, the βi’s are given by (αi,1 − αi,2)/5.
Table 3 – Baseline matrix of rating-migration probabilities
Notes: This matrix is based on Moody’s (2010) [59] (Exhibit 12: One-year average ratings-transition
for European corporates 1985-2009). According to the industry standard, the probability of transitions
to the “not rated” state is distributed among all states in proportion to their values (see Bangia et al.,
2002 [4]).
22The 5-year default probabilities are computed conditionally on the absence of regime switching (i.e. as
if the current regime is to last 5 years).
29Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa-C Default
Aaa 0.911 0.084 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Aa 0.009 0.902 0.083 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
A 0.000 0.042 0.898 0.055 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001
Baa 0.000 0.004 0.072 0.868 0.041 0.009 0.003 0.001
Ba 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.074 0.788 0.107 0.012 0.011
B 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.073 0.794 0.092 0.033
Caa-C 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.106 0.706 0.177
Table 4 – Eigenvalues of the transition matrix under both regimes
Notes: “Regime 1” is consistent with the transition matrix reported in Table 3. Regime 2 is intended
to depict a “crisis” regime. The αi,j’s (i =1 ,...,7, j =1 ,2) are such that the exp(−αi,j)’s are
the eigenvalues –those diﬀerent from 1– of the rating-transition matrix obtained under regime j (when
yr,t =0 ).
5-yr default prob. Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa-C
Regime 1 0.057% 0.24% 0.80% 1.91 % 8.72% 21.8% 52.0%
Regime 2 0.774 % 1.79 % 3.01% 6.40% 16.74% 32.6% 63.2%
-log(eigenvalues) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
αi,1 (i =1 ,...,K− 1)0 . 0 0 9 0 . 0 6 9 0 . 0 9 7 0 . 1 4 3 0 . 2 1 3 0 . 3 1 1 0 . 4 6 4
αi,2 (i =1 ,...,K− 1)0 . 0 1 7 0 . 1 1 0 0 . 1 4 6 0 . 2 0 5 0 . 2 9 4 0 . 4 6 3 0 . 8 0 7
Figure 6 displays yield curves for selected ratings under both regimes (for yr,t =0 ).
Figure 7 presents some simulation results. The upper panel shows the time ﬂuctuations of
downgrade probabilities for two diﬀerent ratings. The lower panel displays yield spreads
between 10-year zero-coupon bonds issued by A-rated or Baa-rated ﬁrms and 10-year zero-
coupon bonds issued by Aaa-rated ﬁrms.
Figure 6: Yield curves for selected ratings (with impact of regimes)
Notes:T h el e f tp l o ts h o w sy i e l dc u r v e sf o rs e l e c t e dr a t i n g s ,w i t hyr,t =0and zt =[ 1 ,0]￿ (solid lines) or zt =[ 0 ,1]￿
(dashed lines). The right plot shows the term structure of spreads vs. Aaa-rated bonds.
30Figure 7: Simulated downgrade probabilities and spreads
Notes:T h el o w e rp l o ts h o w ss i m u l a t e dd o w n g r a d ep r o b a b i l i t i e sf o rt w or a t i n g s( t h ed o w n g r a d ec a nb eo fo n eo rm o r e
notches). Formally, for rating j,t h eu p p e rp a n e lp l o t sP(τn,t >τ n,t−1 | zt,y
t,x n,t,τ n,t−1 = j).T h eg r e y - s h a d e da r e a s
indicate “crisis” periods. The lower plot shows the yield spreads between 10-year zero-coupon bonds issued by A-rated or
Baa-rated debtors and zero-coupon bonds issued by Aaa-rated issuers.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an econometric framework aimed at jointly modeling
yield curves associated with diﬀerent defaultable issuers. Default intensities an yields are
aﬃne functions of a multivariate process which is Compound autoregressive (Car) in the
risk-neutral world and thus provides us with quasi-explicit (recursive) formulas for both
risk-free and defaultable bond prices.
The risk factors follow discrete-time conditionally Gaussian processes, with drifts and
variance-covariance matrices that are subject to regime shifts described by a Markov chain
with (historical) non-homogenous transition probabilities. The regime-switching feature is
relevant for credit models in several respects. First, it makes it possible to capture non-linear
behaviors of yields and spreads, which is consistent with empirical evidence. Second, it is
appropriate to capture default clusters. Third, it oﬀers some ways of dealing with speciﬁc
forms of contagion. To that respect, we show how the framework can be used to capture
sector-contagion phenomena. An other extension accomodates credit-rating migrations.
While ﬂexible, the model remains tractable and amenable to empirical estimation. To that
end, a sequential estimation strategy is proposed in the paper.
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34A. Proofs of Sections 3 and 4



















t−1zt + u￿zt + v￿yt
￿￿




























































Using the expression given for Ai,t−1(u,v) leads to the result.
A.2. P.d.f. under the risk-neutral world (Proof of Lemma 1)
Let us consider a couple (X,Y) of multivariate random vectors. Let denote with fH(X,Y) and
fQ(X,Y) their respective joint p.d.f. under the probability measure H and Q and assume that the




















= fQ(X)fH(Y | X).
A.3. The risk-neutral Laplace transform of (zt,y t,x n,t)
In this appendix, we compute E
Q
t−1 (exp[u￿zt + v￿yt + w￿xn,t]) and show that it is exponential aﬃne




t−1 (exp[u￿zt + v￿yt + w￿xn,t]) = E
Q
t−1 (exp[u￿zt + v￿yt + w￿ (q1n (zt,z t−1)+
Q2nyt + Q3nyt−1 + Q4nxn,t−1 + Q5n (zt,z t−1)ηn,t)])
=e x p ( w￿Q3nyt−1 + w￿Q4nxn,t−1) ×
E
Q
t−1 (exp[u￿zt +( v￿ + w￿Q2n)yt+
w￿q1n (zt,z t−1)+w￿Q5n (zt,z t−1)ηn,t])
=e x p ( w￿Q3nyt−1 + w￿Q4nxn,t−1) ×
E
Q
t−1 (exp[u￿zt + w￿q1n (zt,z t−1)+w￿Q5n (zt,z t−1)ηn,t+
(v￿ + w￿Q2n)((µt + µ∗
t)+( Φ+Φ ∗)yt−1 +Ω tε∗
t)])
=e x p [ {(v￿ + w￿Q2n)(Φ+Φ ∗)+w￿Q3n}yt−1+
w￿Q4nxn,t−1 +









ij exp{uj +( v￿ + w￿Q2n)[µ(ej,e i)+µ∗ (ej,e i)] + w￿q1n (ej,e i)+
1
2






The fact that(zt,y t,x n,t,d n,t) is not Car(1) is obtained by noting that (for dn,t−1 =0 ):
E
Q
t−1 (exp[u￿zt + v￿yt + w￿xn,t + sdn,t]) =
E
Q
t−1 (E (exp[u￿zt + v￿yt + w￿xn,t + sdn,t] | zt,y t,x n,t,d n,t−1 = 0)) =
E
Q
t−1 (exp[u￿zt + v￿yt + w￿xn,t]E (exp[sdn,t] | zt,y t,x n,t,d n,t−1 = 0)) =
E
Q
t−1 (exp[u￿zt + v￿yt + w￿xn,t](exp(−λn,t)+[ 1− exp(−λn,t)]exp(s)))
This shows that E
Q
t−1 (exp[u￿zt + v￿yt + w￿xn,t + sdn,t]) will be only a sum of two terms that are
exponential aﬃne in (zt−1,y t−1,x n,t−1,d n,t−1). Consequently, (zt,y t,x n,t,d n,t) is not Car(1).
A.4. Proof of Lemma 2
The formula is true for h =1since:
Lt,1(ω)=Et (ω￿
HZt+1)=e x p[ a￿(ωH)Zt + b(ωH)]
and therefore A1 = a(ωH) and B1 = b(ωH).

































H−h+1 + Ah−1)Zt + b(ω￿
H−h+1 + Ah−1)+Bh−1
￿
and the result follows.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3
We have:






1yt+1 − ...− a￿
1zt+h−1 − b￿
1yt+h−1).
36Using Lemma 2 with ωH =0 , ω￿
h =( −a￿
1,−b￿












h)=a￿(ωH−h+1 +( ˜ a￿
h−1,˜ b￿
h−1)), ˜ a0 =0and ˜ b0 =0 .
























A.6. Proof of Proposition 5
From Proposition 4, we have:
BD




















Using Lemma 2 with ωH =( −α￿
n,−β￿
n,−γ￿





n) for h =1 ,...,H−
1,w eg e t :
BD

























and ˜ cn,0 =0 , ˜ fn,0 =0and ˜ gn,0 =
0.





















and cn,0 = a1, fn,0 = b1, gn,0 =0 ,w eg e t
BD







A.7. Proof of Proposition 6 (Pricing of defaultable bonds with nonzero
recovery rates)
Section 4 gives quasi-explicit formulas for the pricing of bonds with zero recovery rates. In the
current appendix, we present conditions under which one can derive formulas for nonzero-recovery-
rate bond pricing. Figure 8 presents the payoﬀ schedule considered here. As shown in this ﬁgure,
if a debtor n defaults between t − 1 and t (with t<T, where T denotes the contractual maturity
of a bond issued by this debtor), recovery is assumed to take place at time t. In addition, we
assume that the recovery payoﬀ –i.e. one minus the loss-given-default– depends on (zt,y t,x t). This
recovery payoﬀ is denoted by R
T−t
n,t := R(zt,y t,x t,T− t).
Let us consider the price BDR
n (T − 1,1),i np e r i o dT − 1,o fao n e - p e r i o dn o n z e r o - r e c o v e r y - r a t e
bond issued by a given debtor (before T − 1). We distinguish three cases:
1. The debtor had defaulted before T − 2,t h e n :BDR
n (T − 1,1) = 0.
2. The debtor defaulted between T − 2 and T − 1,t h e n :BDR
n (T − 1,1) = R1
n,T−1.
3. The debtor has not defaulted before T − 1,t h e n :
BDR




T−1,x n,T−1,d n,T−1 =0
￿






T,x n,T,d n,T−1 =0
￿
| zT−1,y
T−1,x n,T−1,d n,T−1 =0
￿




T−1,x n,T−1,d n,T−1 =0
￿






37Figure 8: Payoﬀs stemming from a defaultable bond (issued before t − 1)
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and, deﬁning the random variable ˜ λ0
n,T by exp(−˜ λ0
n,T)=e x p ( −λn,T)+( 1− exp(−λn,T))R0
n,T,w e
have (still in case 3):
BDR
n (T − 1,1) = EQ
￿





Further, let us consider the price of the same bond in period T − 2.A s s u m i n gt h a tt h e r ew a sn o
default before T − 2:
BDR













T−2,x n,T−2,d n,T−2 =0
￿
(29)
Let us introduce a random variable ζ1










With this notation, Equation (29) reads:
BDR
n (T − 2,2) = EQ
￿




















T−1,x n,T−1,d n,T−2 =0
￿
| zT−2,y














Then, deﬁning the random variable ˜ λ1
n,T−1 by:
exp(−˜ λ1
n,T−1)=e x p ( −λn,T−1)+( 1− exp(−λn,T−1))ζ1
n,T−1,
38we get (conditionally on dn,T−2 =0 ):
BDR
n (T − 2,2) = EQ
￿
exp(−rT − rT−1 − ˜ λ0





Applying this methodology recursively, it is easily seen that the price of a nonzero-recovery-rate





exp(−rt+h − ...− rt+1 − ˜ λ0






where the ˜ λ
h−i
n,t+i’s are deﬁned recursively in i by the backward equation:
exp(−˜ λ
h−i





















Rt+h,0 if i = h.
Looking at Equation (30), it is tempting to interpret the ˜ λ
h−i
n,t+i’s as “recovery-adjusted” hazard
rates for debtor n.H o w e v e r ,t h ed e p e n d e n c yo ft h e s ei n t e n s i t i e so nt h em a t u r i t yh of the considered
bond is problematic. Indeed, by analogy with the standard default intensities λn,t,o n ew o u l dl i k e
to have, at each period, only one adjusted intensity by debtor (and not a collection of adjusted
intensities associated with the diﬀerent bonds that have been issued by the considered debtor). To
that end, Duﬃe and Singleton (1999) [28] propose a “recovery of market value” assumption. Under
this assumption, the variable Rm
n,s –that is, the recovery at time s of a bond with residual maturity
m,i nt h ee v e n to fd e f a u l tb e t w e e ns − 1 and s–i se q u a lt ot h ep r o d u c to faf a c t o rcommon to all
maturities with the survival-contingent market value at time s. In the same spirit, let us assume
that the ζm
n,s’s do no longer depend on m. Then, the ˜ λm
n,s do not depend on the maturity any longer
and are simply given by:
exp(−˜ λn,s)=e x p ( −λn,s)+( 1− exp(−λn,s))ζn,s.
Actually, this formulation is more general than the one considered by Duﬃe and Singleton (1999)
when they expose a discrete-time motivation. Indeed, in the latter case, they assume that ζn,s is
known at time s − 1, which is not necessarily the case in the framework described above.
B. Kitagawa-Hamilton algorithm for partially-hidden Markov
chains
In this appendix, we describe how to use the Hamilton’s (1990) [42] algorithm within the estimation
strategy presented in Section 6, when the Markov chain is partially observed. While the algorithm
was originally presented in a model with ﬁxed transition probabilities, it readily generalizes to
processes in which transition probabilities depend on a vector of observed variables.23
Let us denote with ˆ yt the vector of observed variables (˜ y￿
t,R 1t,z￿
1t)￿. The Hamilton’s algorithm
consists in computing recursively the probabilities p(z2t | ˆ y
t).A s a b y p r o d u c t , t h e a l g o r i t h m
provides the conditional densities f(ˆ yt | ˆ y
t−1), which makes it possible to estimate the model
parameters by maximization of the log-likelihood. The algorithm is based on the iterative imple-
mentation of the following steps (the input being p(z2t−1 | ˆ y
t−1)):
23See e.g. Filardo (1994) [33] for implementation examples of Hamilton’s algorithm in models with time-
varying transition probabilities.
391. The joint probability p(z2t,z 2t−1 | ˆ yt−1) is computed using:
p
￿










z2t−1 | ˆ y
t−1
￿
where the ﬁrst term of the right-hand side is a sum of entries of the transition matrix {πij,t−1}
and the second term is the input.
2. The joint conditional density f(ˆ yt,z 2t,z 2t−1 | ˆ y
t−1) is then given by:
f(ˆ yt,z 2t,z 2t−1 | ˆ y
t−1)=f(ˆ yt | z2t,z 2t−1,ˆ y
t−1) × p
￿




f(ˆ yt | z2t,z 2t−1,ˆ y
t−1)=f(˜ yt,R 1t,z 1t | z2t,z 2t−1,ˆ y
t−1)
= f(˜ yt,R 1t | z1t,z 2t,z 2t−1,ˆ y
t−1) × p(z1t | z2t,z 2t−1,ˆ y
t−1)
with
p(z1t | z2t,z 2t−1,ˆ y
t−1)=
p(z1t,z 2t | z2t−1,ˆ y
t−1)
p(z2t | z2t−1,ˆ y
t−1)
and all the terms can be computed.
3. The conditional densityf(ˆ yt | ˆ y
t−1) is given by:






f(ˆ yt,z 2t,z 2t−1 | ˆ y
t−1).
4. The joint density p
￿










f(ˆ yt,z 2t,z 2t−1 | ˆ y
t−1)


















C. About the eigenvectors of the rating-migration matrix Π
In this appendix, using the notations presented in Subsection 8.4, we outline some properties of
matrices Π and V .F o r n o t a t i o n a l s i m p l i c i t y , w e d r o p a r g u m e n t s a n d t i m e s u b s c r i p t s a s s o c i a t e d
with these matrices.





eigenvector of Π associated with the eigenvalue 1. Consequently, since this eigenvalue is
supposed to be the last one appearing in Ψ,t h el a s tc o l u m no fV –that collects the eigevectors










Since we have ΠV = V Ψ,i tc o m e s( c o n s i d e r i n gt h el a s tl i n eo ft h i se q u a t i o n ) :
∀jV K,j = VK,j exp(−ψj),
which implies: ∀j<K ,V K,j =0 .











VK−1,1 ··· VK−1,K−1 γ





Since VV−1 = I,w eh a v e( c o n s i d e r i n gt h el a s tl i n ea n du s i n gt h en o t a t i o nV
−1
i,j for the entry











0 ··· 0 1
γ
￿
and, therefore, for i =1 ,...,K,w eh a v eVi,KV
−1
K,K =1 .
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